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enable those who are unlearned in the law to do the work of a
lawyer, is worse than useless. No man can master all professions
and arts.
The duties of each profession, art, or business, should be per.
formed by those who understand them.
Wm. LAWRENCE.
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Supreme Court of JErrorsof Connecticut.
WILLIAM A. STUDWELL v. AUSTIN H. COOKE.
By the strict rules of law a tender of performance, as incident to the legal duty
to perform, could not anciently be made after the day fixed for performance, and
before suit brought.
A different rule was adopted early in this state, Tracy v. Strong, 2 Conn. 659,
and a tender may be made here at any time after the breach, and before the commencement of the action.
Costs are not incident to the debt, or to the action until it is pending, and
although expense may have been made preparatory to its commencement, the
plaintiff has no right to demand costs for that reason, nor is the defendant
obliged to tender them until they become thus incident by the commencement
of the action, which in this state is the actual service of process on the defendant.
There is no equity in favor of a creditor to require a debtor to pay the expenses
of proceedings taken for the institution of a suit, before its actual commence.
meat, so strong as to prevail over the right of the debtor to make tender of the
debt.
No right to costs by reason of an equity has ever been recognised by the common law, and a court of law cannot yield to such an equity without a departure
from principle.
From a review of the authorities in England and in this country, it appears that
every attempt which has been made to induce courts of law to recognise such an.
equity, and to require payment of costs before suit pending, has failed.
Therefore, where in foreign attachment, after service on the garnishee, but be.
fore service on the defendant, the defendant tendered to the plaintiff the amount
of the debt alone, without the costs of the suit, it was held that such tender was
sufficient.
GENERAL ASSUMPSIT; appealed from the judgment of a justice
of the peace to the Court of Common Pleas, and tried on the
general issue closed to the court with notice of tender.
Philip B. Lever, of Stamford, in Fairfield county, on the 1st
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day of March 1871, was owing the defendant a certain amount,
and on that day the plaintiff legally attached all the goods and
effects of the defendant in the hands of Lever. On the 3d
day of March 1871, the defendant, learning of said attachment,
made a tender to the plaintiff of the sum of five dollars, the
amount of debt then due to the plaintiff from the defendant,
and did not tender to the plaintiff any amount for costs made
in the suit previous to that time. On the 4th day of March
1871, a copy of the original writ and process was left with the
defendant by a sheriff's deputy, which was the only service on
the defendant himself.
Upon these facts the plaintiff claimed that the tender was insuffi
cient, because it was made after service upon the garnishee,
and did not cover the costs already made by such service upon
the garnishee, in addition to the debt. And the defendant
claimed that the tender was sufficient, because it was made before
service upon the defendant himself. The court held that the
tender was sufficient, and rendered judgment for the defendant.
The plaintiff moved for a new trial.
Olmstead and Curtis, in support of the motion.
Child and Pessenden, contra.
BUTLER, C. J.-The right to make tender of performance, as
incident to the legal duty to perform, is as old, as absolute and as
well settled as any principle of the law. By the strict rules of
the law it could not anciently be made after the day fixed for
performance, and before suit brought, and such has been the rule
in some of our sister states until a recent period, and until
changed by statute. A different rule was adopted early in this
state (Tracyv. Strong, 2 Conn. 659), and a tender may be made here
at any time after the breach, and before the commencement of
the action.
Where the tender is made before the commencement of the
action, no costs need be tendered. This rule, so far as I can
learn, is universal. Costs are not incident to the debt, or to the
action until it is pending, and then only by force of statute, and
although expense may have been made preparatory to its commencement, the plaintiff has no right to demand costs for that
reason, nor is the defendant obliged to tender them until they
become thus incident.
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Every state has necessarily a rule which determines the stage
in legal proceedings which shall be deemed a commencement of
the action. In some of the states the rule is established by
statute, in others by judicial decision. In this state it is fixed by
decisions of this court, and is the actual service of process on the
defendant, "that notice given to the defendant which makes
him a party to the proceeding, and makes it incumbent on
him to appear and answer to the cause, or run the risk of having
a valid judgment rendered against him by default:" Sanford v.
.Dick, 17 Oonn. 216.
Such being the right of tender, without cost, before the commencement of suit, universally recognised, and such the rule in
relation to the commencement of suit in this state, and this tender
having been confessedly made before such commencement, we
must hold the tender good unless the plaintiff has given us sufficient reason for departing from a rule which is as old as the law
of tender.
On looking into his brief we find two reasons assigned. The
first is, that when an officer has so far commenced the service of a
writ as to attach property, either by process of foreign attachment, or otherwise, the law requires that he shall complete the
service for his own protection, and therefore the tender of the
whole cost becomes necessary, and that, as the law requires the
completion of the service, and never compels a party or an officer
to do an act and then suffer for it, the costs made for the purpose
of commencing the action should be tendered.
The import of this claim of the plaintiff is, that it is inequitable
for a defendant by his default of performance to compel a plaintiff to institute a suit, or rather to be at the expense of commencing the institution of a suit, without requiring him to pay
such expense, if he makes tender after it is incurred and before
the commencement of the action. The second reason is, that the
expenses so incurred have so attached themselves to the debt that
a tender of the debt is insufficient.
The answer to these claims is, first, that the equity is not what
at first blush it seems to be; second, that a court of law could
not yield to the equity, if as strong as it is assumed to be,
without a departure from principle; third, that in every known
case where an attempt has been made to induce the courts to
VOL. X
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adopt the equity ana require the tender of costs, the attempt has
failed.
I. The equity is not what at first blush it seems to be. The
right of a defendant to tender is an absolute and important
right, which a court, without just cause, cannot abridge. The
right of the plaintiff to secure his debt by an attachment-lien is
also an absolute right, but it is arbitrarily created for the benefit
of the plaintiff, and it is at his option whether he will incur the
expense or not; and if he prefers to be at the expense of acquiring such a lien, with the hazard of having the debt tendered
before the expense has become incident to the litigation by action
pending, be can exercise his option, but as a privilege, not as a
common-law right.
But admitting that it is equitable that he should have the costs
so made to acquire a lien, it is also equitable that the defendant
should enjoy his right of tender without other burden or expense. The rule we are asked to adopt would burden his right
materially. It would throw upon him the burden of ascertaining,
in many cases, before he could tender, whether process had been
issued and served or not, and if issued and served, by whom
issued, and what the expense of it, to what officer delivered, and
how served, if served, and the expense of such service. And
when he sought the necessary information, the creditor might
refuse to give it, and would in many cases be tempted to do so.
If the creditor referred the debtor to his attorney, he may reside
in another and distant town, and when sought may be absent, and
if found may refuse to answer. If the debtor is so fortunate as
to ascertain the iiame of the officer, he might also reside in another
and distant town, and be absent when there sought, or be un.willing to suspend the service. Thus, the attempt to enforce tho
equity in favor of the plaintiffs might entail much trouble and expense, in a majority of cases, upon debtors, and in many cases
where the suit may be wanton and oppressive. Then, too, in
cases where the amount of the debt should be in dispute, the3re
would be the temptation to use some question arising out of the
claim for costs to defeat the tender, and for officers and counsel to
claim exorbitant charges, against which the debtor would have no
redress by taxation. Thus, and in many other ways which might
be suggested, the debtor might be subjected to trouble and expense
which would practically destroy his right to tender before suit
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brought. Clearly the equity of the plaintiff is not what it is
assumed to be, when carefully considered.
The reasons which have been urged why we should enforce the
equity of the plaintiff do not reach to any right, but relate merely
to the strength of the supposed equity. Their import is, that the
officer must complete his service, otwithstanding the tender, and
that the plaintiff should be entitled to all the costs of completing
the service. This claim would require the defendant to tender.
costs to be made in order to complete the service, and from the
time that the writ was put in the hands of the officer, or as soon
as any act was done by him. How are such future costs to be
ascertained ? How is the debtor to know what further service
the officer proposes to make ? What protection has he against
oppressive charges ? It is obvious, I think, that the counsel for
the plaintiff have not sufficiently considered the consequences
which would result from the adoption of the rule, and it is equally
obvious that the reason urged is without force. A plaintiff to
whom the debt has been tendered, and who has accepted it, may
safely direct the service to be suspended, and the officer may
safely suspend it, for the tender is an implied request to that
effect.
II. A court of law cannot yield to the assumed equity without
a departure from principle. No right to costs by reason of an
equity has ever been recognised by the common law. Costs are
wholly the creature of statute, at law, and of discretion, in equity.
Costs were first given to a defendant by the Statute of 52 Henry
III., chap. 6, in a particular case. Till then they were unknown
to the law. Subsequently they were given to plaintiffs by the
Statute of Gloucester (6 Edw. I., chap. 1, § 2), in all cases where
they should recover damages, and then and thereby became inciVents of an action. Since then they have been given to parties
litigant, and regulated in England and this country, by a very
great number of special statutes, or by rules of court authorized
by statute. In this state, in addition to the general statute, there
are more than forty special ones giving or regulating them. The
right to costs, therefore, in all cases at law, on interlocutory or
final decisions, in England and this country, if it exists, rests on
the provisions of some statute, or some rule of court authorized
by statute, anI where no statute has given a right none exists,
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and this doctrine has never been permanently departed from, and
is universally recognised.
III. Every attempt to induce courts of law to adopt the rule
insisted on, whether made in England or in this country, has
failed.
The first attempt in England was made in the case of Briggs v.
Galverly, in the Court of King's Bench, in 1800, 8 Term Rep.
629. The plaintiff replied to a plea of tender, that before tender
he had retained an attorney who had applied for a latitat, and
that there was not time after the tender to countermand its
issuance, and that he had been subjected to expense and cost,
which the defendant should have tendered. Lord KENYON overruled the replication, saying that it was impossible to contend
that the tender came too late, it having been made before the
commencement of the suit. Such is the law of England to this
day.
A like decision was made in Ireland, in Hepburn v. Plunlcett,
8 Irish Law Rep. 10, where to a plea of tender there was a replication that costs had been made before the tender and before the
commencement of the action. The court, on demurrer to the
replication, held the tender good. And such is the rule there.
The question also arose and was decided in this court in the case
of Holdridgev. Wells, in 1801 (cited 4 Conn. 141.) Judge SWIFT
thus speaks of it in his Digest, which was published in 1822:
"A question has arisen in this state, whether after a debtor has
knowledge that a writ is in the hands of the sheriff, though not
served, a tender of the debt without the cost of suit would be
good, and it was decided that a debtor could never be bound to
tender for cost till it had accrued by the actual service of a writ.
and till that time he was bound to tender the amount of the debt
only; that this was a plain rule by which debtors might govern
their conduct, while a contrary rule would perplex them with uncertainty, and involve them in disputes."
In 1838 the Supreme Court of Ncw York, in the case of Betan
v. Drew, 19 Wend. 304, held that the tender of money in satisfaction of a debt, after costs had been made before the commencement of the action by service of the declaration, without the
tender of such costs, was not a good tender. This decision,
although made by an able court, was not satisfactory to the profession, and in 1849, the question was again presented to the court
in Hull v. Peters, 7 Barb. 331, and Betan v. Drew was overruled.
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A few extracts from the able and exhaustive opinion in that case
will fully illustrate the subject. After referring to some previous
cases the court say: "In Retan v. Drew, however, the point was
presented and decided. The action there was assumpsit; the
plea, tender before suit brought. The plaintiff replied that the
tender was made after the declaration was filed, though before it
was served, and that the damages and no cost were tendered.
Upon demurrer to the replication the court held it good, upon
the ground that the plaintiff was entitled to the cost of preparing
to commence his suit. The distinguished judge who delivered the
brief opinion of the court in that case said, that "the action was
not commenced for all purposes, yet the plaintiff before the tender
having employed an attorney and incurred expense, and proceeding with all diligence to serve the declaration, the tender was
insufficient without an offer to pay costs-that a diferent rule
would work injustice. The authorities cited for this opinion are
19 Wend. 91; 2 Johns. Oases 145; 2 Johns. 842. The first of
these cases has been already examined and shown to have no applicability to this question. That in Johnson's Cases decides that
the issuing of a caias was the commencement of a suit, and that
a demand against the plaintiff subsequently acquired by the defendant could not be made available as a set-off. The case in
Johnson's Reports decides that an averment in a plea that a cause
of action was settled before the capias was sued out, is a good
averment that the settlement was before suit brought. Thus it
will be observed that we do not find any authority or precedent
for the judgment in Retan v. Drew, and we shall not find it supported by subsequent adjudications." * * * "The decision
rests solely on the moral equity of the case, that the debtor should
reimburse to the creditor expenses necessarily incurred by reason
of the neglect of the former punctually to perform his obligations. With due deference, I submit that the case of -etan v.
Drew is a departure from settled principles, and is not sustained
by authority." * * * " Costs are recoverable, not simply
because their recovery is just, but because the statute gives them.
There is no statute -giving a creditor the expenses of preparing
to bring a suit, as such. Until a suit be actually commenced the
statute knows no such thing as costs. When an action is pending, and not until then, they become an incident to the litigation.
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I am of opinion, therefore, that the tender of the debt in this
case was sufficient without paying the plaintiff's cost."
We thus see that the Supreme Court of New York in Retan v.
Drew, without sufficient consideration, followed their sense of
equity, and established the rule which we are asked to establish.
But the same court shortly after, in Hull v. Peters, held the rule
to be a departure from principle, and reversed it. The lattei
ease is embodied in the Digest of Abbott, published in 1860, and
that of Clinton, published this year (1871), as law, while the
former is placed by both in their tables of disapproved and overruled cases, and the courts of that great commercial state remain
steadfast to principle.
The foregoing cases are all that I have been able to find by
extended search, in which an effort has been made to induce a
court of law to require a tender of cost before suit pending, and
in all the decisions have conformed to principle and been adverse.
For these reasons I think a new trial should be denied.
In this opinion FOSTER and GRANGER, Js., concurred. PARK
and CARPENTER, Js., concurred in refusing a new trial on the
ground that the rule of "stare decisis" should be applied to former
decisions of the court.
The rule seems to be abundantly established in the English courts that a tender before action brought need not include any expense to which the creditor
may have been in order to collect his
debt before the serving of the writ.
Thus, where the creditor had sued out a
writ, but did not proceed with it before
it became obsolete, it was held the debtor
was not bound to tender the cost of such
writ: Stratton v. Savignac, 3 3. & P. 330.
So, also, in the case cited in the opinion,
Briggs v. Calverly, 8 T. R. 629, where
the creditor had retained an attorney,
and instructed him to sue out a writ
against the defendant, and he had accordingly applied for the writ before the
.ender, but which was sued out afterwards, it was held no expense on these
accounts need be tendered. So, also,
where the attorney wrote a letter to the

debtor requiring him to pay the debt,
and the attorney's charge for the letter,
by a time named, or proceedings, would
be commenced, and the debtor tcndered
the amount of the debt alone, before the
time named, which was refused because
the expense of the letter was not tendered, the tender was held good : Kir.
ton v. Braithlwaite, 1 'M. & W. 310.
And although a tender out of court
after suit brought is not, in the English
practice, regarded as valid, since the
matter is considered as in court and to
be there adjusted after the service of the
writ, yet if the aiiount of debt and the
expense of the writ and service is tendered before declaration filed, the debtor
will not be held liable for after costs,
which in that case will be regarded as
made without any ust cause. But there
should be an actual tender of the debt

STUDWELL v. COOKE.
and present costs, in order to entitle the
debtor to a stay of proceedings : Gibbon
v. Copeian, 5 Taunt. 840.
And in the English practice the debtor
may always pay money into court, at
any time dnring the pendency of the
suit, to cover the costs already accrued,
and a certain amount of the debt, which
he admits to be due, and thereupon oblain a rule upon the plaintiff to accept
the same or else thereafter proceed at
the peril of recovering no more costs,
and also paying the defendant's costs
after that time, unless he should recover
a greater amount of debt than had been
thus offered: Cooper v. Blick, 2 Adolphus & Ellis 971 ; H.de v. .3foffat, 16
Ver. 271, 286. This is allowed under
the English statute of 3 & 4 Win. 4, c.
42, s. 21, and extends to all personal
actions, with certain exceptions, such as
assault and battery, false imprisonment,
libel, slander and seduction. But by I
Viet. c. 7, these excepted actions are
many of them embraced. A single judge
may make the order for paying money
into court even before declaration filed :
Edwards v. Price, 6 Dowl. P. C. 489.
It would seem that the right of the defendant to pay money into court, in all
these actions where the claim was for a
definite amount, and where by consequence a tender at common .law might
be made, has been recognised, in the
English"courts, from an early day, long
before the date of the statute just referred to : Lawrence v. Cox, Bull. N. P.
24 ; Vernon v. Wynne, 1 H. BI. 24 ; Hitton v. Bolton, Id. 229 n.; Tidd's Prac

tice 670 ; ail v. Pickford, 2 B. & P.
234. Money was not formerly allowed
to be paid into court after plea pleaded :
Thorton, q. t. v. Gibson, I Wils. 157.
But in later times, in the English practice, it has been allowed to be paid into
court even after a new trial : Tidd's
Practice 672.
The plaintiff may at any time take the
money out of court upon discontinuing
his action and deducting the defendants'
costs after the same was paid into court :
Foulstone v. .Blackmore, 1 Y. & J. 213.
The statute of 3 & 4 Win. 4, before referred to, seems to recognise the right
of the English judges to make rules in
regard to the payment of the costs of the
action, and the practice seems to have
sometimes prevailed for the defendant to
enter into a rule for the plaintiff to sign
judgment for his costs upon accepting
the money, and if that were done at a
stage of the proceedings after the money
is paid in, the defendant's future costs
will be deducted from the plaintiff's
costs.
If the money is paid in upon a portion of the plaintiff's claims, he will be
at liberty to accept it and proceed for
the remainder: 4 Bing. N. C. 814; 4
M. & W. 2. But we need not pursue
the subject further. Although the dubject of tender and payment of money
into court is somewhat familiar, it is
one of great practical importance, since
the costs of litigation become often of
vital consequence. The principal case
seems to us a valuable one.
L F. R.

Supreme Court of Errorsof Connecticut.
MAPLES v. THE NEW YORK AND NEW HAVEN RAILRO&D
COMPANY.
The plaintiff purchased of the defendants a commutation ticket, which conferred
upon him the right to ride in the cars upon the defendants' railroad between the
city of New York and the town of Westport during the ensuing year, upon certain
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conditions. One of the conditions was that the ticket should be shown to conductors when requested, or when required by the rules of the company. One
of the company's rules in force during the year required commuters to show their
tickets to conductors when required, in the same manner as other passengers. At
the time of purchasing the ticket the plaintiff signed a receipt containing similar
conditions. During the year, while the plaintiff was riding in the defendants'
cars between New York and Westport, he was requested by the conductor to show
his ticket. The plaintiff had his ticket upon his person, but was unable to find it
at the time, and so informed the conductor. The conductor knew that the
plaintiff was a commuter, and that the time covered by his ticket had not expired,
but acting in accordance with the instructions of the defendants, he demanded of
the plaintiff his fare for the trip, and on his refusal to pay it ejected him from the
train.
Held, that the plaintiff was not bound to produce his ticket immediately when
requested, but was entitled to a reasonable time to find it, and was entitled to ride
as long as there was any reasonable expectation of finding it during the trip ; that
under the circumstances the production of his ticket by the plaintiff was the merest
formality, and that in the absence of an express stipulation in the contract that
the plaintiff should pay the fare of the passage unless the ticket should be produced, his failure to produce the ticket was not such a breach of the contract as to
justify the defendants in rescinding it, and treating the plaintiff as a trespasser on
the train ; and that if the defendants had a right to eject the plaintiff from the
train, they had no right to do so elsewhere than at a regular station on the roadthat any rule or regulation of the defendants which required or allowed such an
act to be done between stations to a person in the condition of the plaintiff was
unreasonable and void.

TRESPASS ON THE CASE,

for the ejection of the plaintiff from

the defendants' cars by a conductor ; brought to the Superior
Court, and tried on the general issue closed to the jury. The
court rendered judgment of nonsuit, and the plaintiff filed a motion in error for the refusal of the court to set aside the nonsuit.
The facts are sufficiently stated in the opinion.
Thompson, for the plaintiff in error.
Child, for the defendants in error.
PARK, J.-We think there is manifest error in the decision of
the court below in refusing to set aside the nonsuit that had been
ordered by the court. Some time in the month of December 1868,
the plaintiff purchased of the defendants a commutation ticket,
which conferred upon him the right to ride in the cars upon the
defendants' railroad from the town of Westport to the city of New
York, during the year 1869, upon certain conditions. One of
the conditions was that the ticket should be shown to conductors
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when requested, or when required by the rules of the company.
One of the company's rules in force during the year, and the only
one that it is important to consider, was as follows: "Commuters
will show their tickets to the conductors in the same manner as other
passengers, when required." One of the conditions in the receipt
signed by the plaintiff at the time he received his commutation
ticket from the defendants was to this effect: "The commutation
ticket is to be shown to conductors, and whenever otherwise
required by the rules of the company, in the same manner as are
other passenger tickets."
On the 24th day of May 1869, the plaintiff entered the cars
of tha defendants at the city of New York, to ride over the de..
fendants' road to his home in Westport. When the train was
about four miles from the city the conductor of the train requested the plaintiff to show his ticket. The plaintiff bad his
ticket, but was unable to find it at the time, and so informed the
conductor. The conductor knew that the plaintiff was a commuter, and that the time mentioned in the ticket had not expired,
but acting in accordance with the instructions of the defendants,
he demanded of the plaintiff his fare for the trip, and told him
that unless he paid it he should eject him from the train. The
plaintiff refused to pay the fare, on the ground that he had his
ticket but was unable to find it, and had paid his fare by the purchase of the ticket. Thereupon the conductor stopped the train
and ejected the plaintiff from the cars. During the morning of
that day the plaintiff rode to New York on his ticket, and at night
when he retired it was found upon his person. These are the
principal facts, and we think they show that the defendants broke
their contract with the plaintiff in ejecting him from the train at
the time it was done. When the conductor requested the plaintiff to produce his ticket it happened to be mislaid. The plaintiff
was entitled to a reasonable time to find it. The contract required him to show his ticket to the conductor, but he was not
The conductor
bound to do it immediately when requested.
knew the plaintiff was a commuter, and the only question in his
mind was whether the plaintiff would be able to produce his
ticket. The plaintiff informed him that he had it,, but was unable
to find it because it was mislaid. Under such circumstances the
plaintiff was entitled to ride as long as there was any reasonable
expectation of finding it during the trip. Had a reasonable time
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been allowed him to find it, undoubtedly it would have been found,
for it was upon his person, and dropped from his garments when
he undressed himself to retire that night. The ease was unlike that of Downs v. New York J .Pew Haven -RailroadCo., 36
Conn. 287. There the plaintiff had left his ticket at home, and
so informed the conductor. The ticket could not by possibility
be produced, and the plaintiff knew it, and so did the conductor.
Delay in that case would have been of no avail. The fact was
certain. The case here is directly the opposite of that in this
important respect.
Again, in the case of Downs there was an express stipulation in
the contract that he should pay his fare for the trip if the ticket
should not be shown to the conductor when requested. Here
there was no such stipulation. It is true the contract required
the plaintiff to show his ticket to conductors when requested by
them, or when required by the rules of the company, but it may
well be questioned whether the breach of such a condition in the
contract gave the defendants the right to eject him from the
train, when they knew through their conductor that he was a commuter, and knew that his inability to produce the ticket arose
simply from the fact that his ticket was mislaid. In the case of
Downs the trip was virtually excepted from the operation of the
ticket by the express stipulation in the contract to pay fare for
the trip if the ticket should not be produced. The case was the
same as it would have been if the contract had declared in express terms that the ticket should only apply to cases where it
was produced, and all other cases should be excepted from its
operation. Downs, therefore, was nothing more than a common
passenger on the train, without a common passenger ticket, and
was liable to be dealt with as a common passenger. But here the
contract embraced the trip as much as it did any other trip that
the plaintiff might make on the road. The plaintiff agreed to
show his ticket in like manner with other passengers. This was
required in order that the conductor might know that he was a
commutel. But the conductor knew the fact.
The production of the ticket under such circumstances was the
merest formality. Suppose the plaiptiff had agreed with the defendants that he would show his ticket to the conductor three
times during each passage over the road, and on the trip in question he had shown his ticket twice to the conductor, but when
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required the third time to produce it the ticket happened to be
mislaid. Suppose the conductor should distinctly remember that
the ticket had been twice produced, and the production of it the
third time would give him no needful information. Would the defendants be justified in ejecting him from the train without an
express stipulation in the contract that the plaintiff should pay
the fare of the passage unless the ticket should be three times
produced? We think not. So we think here. There must be
something more than the merest technical breach of the contract,
in order to justify the defendants in rescinding it so far as it applied to the trip, and treating the plaintiff as a trespasser upon
the train.
We have made no allusion to the order that was passed by the
defendants in January, after the plaintiff purchased his ticket.
That order has no application to the case, for it is ohvious that
the defendants could not at that time add new conditions to the
plaintiff's contract. That order was in force when Downs made
his contract with the defendants, and it was an important consideration in the decision of that case.
Again, we think on another ground that the plaintiff made out
a primd facie case against the defendants. The plaintiff was
ejected from the train at Harlem, which was not a station on the
defendants' road. Conceding that under the circumstances we
have detailed the defendants had the right to eject the plaintiff
from the train, we think they had no right to do it elsewhere than
at some regular station on the road. Any rule or regulation of
the defendants that requires or allows such an act to be done between stations to a person in the condition of the plaintiff, thus
subjecting him to the trouble and expense of going a number of
miles in order to take another train, savors too much of vindictiveness to be reasonable. We have no hesitation in saying that
such a rule is unreasonable, and is therefore void so far as it applies to a case like the one under consideration. We say this
without reference to the statute of 1867. Whether that statute
applies to the case or not we leave undetermined.
For these reasons we think there is manifest error in the judgment of the court refusing to set aside the nonsuit that had been
ordered in the case.
In this opinion the other judges concurred.
There can be no question of the sound- have sometimes questioned how far the
ness of the decision in this case. We conductor of a railway train should to
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allowed to require passengers to produce
their tickets out of mere wantonness,
and when he has no doubt they have
them. It may he said this must be done
or else others will feel aggrieved, when
required to produce their tickets. Reasonable persons would never feel so, if
bend fide dealt with in the matter. And
if the passenger has the ticket present,
it is no hardship to produce it. But if
lie happens to have left it at home or
mislaid it for the moment, it requires
some consideration how far the rule is to
be enforced out of mere wantonness, when
the passenger has paid his fare, and this
is well known to the conductor. If the
passenger stipulates in the purchase of a
commutation ticket, to pay another fare
unless lie produce his ticket, as in Downs
v. N. Y. j- N. II. Buailr,,ad, 36 Coun.
287, he should be bound by the contract.
But upon the mere force of a rule of the

company to require the passengers to
produce their tickets when so requested
by the conductor, it seems to admit of
some doubt, whether the penalty of paying double fare should be enforced, when
the facts show that the passenger did all
in his power to comply with the rule,
and that the company suffered no detriment. The reason for the rule failing
the rule itself ought to fail, upon the
well known maxim, cessante ratione cessat et lex. It would rather seem that a
rule of this kind enforcing the penalty in
such a case as the present ought to be
held unreasonable and therefore void to
that extent. But we know that rules, to
be of much value, require strict enforcement. And, where the ticket niight be
used by any one, the conductor might
be justified in requiring its production,
in order to secure the company against
redeeming it again.
I. F. R.

Sutreme Judicial Court of Aew HMampshire.
ADAMS v. ADAMS.
Courts have power to set aside or vacate decrees of divorce for fraud or imposi.ion, as in the case of other judgments, and will exercise that power where such
fraud or imposition is clearly established.

Tis was a motion by Melinda Adams to set aside a decree of
divorce granted in this county (Hillsborough), December Term
1864.
The libellee offered to show that the divorce was obtained without notice to her, and by fraud and perjury; that the libellant.
George W. Adams, knew her residence at the time, and caused
the order of notice to be published in a newspaper that he lad
every reason to believe neither she nor her friends would see, for
the purpose of concealing from her any notice of the proceedings ; that this motion was made at the first term of the court
after she was informed that the divorce had been granted.
The libellie also offered to prove that the libellant had not remarried since the decree of divorce was granted.
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The court, pro forma, ruled that the evidence was not competent, and could not be considered; to which the libellee excepted.
The case was reserved.

Geo. Y. Sawyer . Sawyer, Jr., and Isaac W. Smith, for the libellant.-Tbe decree of divorce in this case at the Dec. Term 1864,
is a judgment as conclusive between the parties as a common-law
judgment. It determined the status of the parties as to their
matrimonial relations, and judicially declared them to be no longer
husband and wife. It is now sought, after the lapse of seven
years, to obtain a rehearing for the purpose of having their status
during these seven years, and now judicially declared to be that
of persons married to each other instead of divorced from each
other. No rule or principle of law authorizes such a rehearing
subsequent to the term of court at which the cause was finally
adjudicated: Greene v. Greene, 2 Gray 361; Parishv. Pariqh,
9 Ohio St. 534.
Lord & Sulloway, Morison & Stanley and B. P. Cilley, for
ibellee.
BELLOWS, C. J.-As a general proposition, courts have power
to set aside, vacate, modify or annul their judgments for good
cause shown: Judge of Probatev. Webster, 46 N. H. 518; Bellows v. Stone, 14 Id. 203 ; .Trink v. Fink, 43 Id. 508 ; Wiggin
v. Veasey, 43 Id. 513, and cases cited, and Chamberlainv. Crane,
4 Id. 115.
In this respect decrees in divorce suits stand upon the same
footing as other judgments, both upon principle and authority.
Bishop, in his work on Marriage and Divorce, 1st ed., § 697, lays
it down as a general proposition, that the American tribunals,
when unencumbered by specific statutory directions, have been
governed by substantially the same principles in divorce causes
as in others, in respect to opening decrees, or granting rehearings, writs of error, or certiorarior otherwise, according to the
practice of the court, re-examining the question, except that there
has always been a manifest reluctance to disturb a final judgment of
divorce, especially after a second marriage involving the interests
of third persons; for which he cites authorities from Ohio, New
York, Kentucky and Delaware. So is 1 Phillipps's Ev. 341. The

ADAMS v. ADAMIS.

same doctrine is laid down in a later edition by the same author:
2 Bish. on Mar. and Div., § 751.
It is equally well settled that judgments may be set aside or
vacated when procured by fraud, but not on the application of a
person who is himself a party to the fraud, nor will the judgment
be avoided for fraud when the same question of fraud was tried
in the original action. This doctrine, is fully sustained by the
case of Tebbetts v. Tilton, 31 N. 11. 2$7, and cases cited; anl ir.
that case the subject was carefully considered.
So it is well settled that a judgment may be vacated, or the
record of it amended, on the ground that it was entered up by
mistake: Bellows v. Stone, 14 N. 11. 203; and in this case the
application to set it aside was made more than eleven years after the
judgment was rendered. This was a bill in equity; and although
it was held that courts of equity will set aside judgments at law
when obtained by fraud, it would not do so for any error in the
proceedings, but leave the party to his petition in the court of
law: Chamberlainv. Orane, 4 N. H. 115; Wiggin v. Veasey, 43
Id. 813, and JFrink v. Frink, Id. 508, are cases where mistakes
in entering up judgments were corrected many years after the
judgments were rendered.
Much more should judgments be corrected or vacated when
aley have been obtained by the fraud of one party, and the other
is in no way implicated in it. The authorities, indeed, to this
point are numerous and quite satisfactory in other jurisdictions.
Among them are Fermor's Case, 3 Co. 77, 78 a; Story on Confl.
of Laws, § 597 ; Starkie's Ev., pt. 2, §§ 77 and 88; Ducess of
Kingston's Case, 11 State Trials 261; 1 Phillipps's Ev. 341; 2
Kent's Com. 655. In .ermor's Case it is laid down that the law
so abhors fraud and covin that all acts, as well judicial as others,
which of themselves are just and lawful, yet, being mixed with
fraud and deceit, are in judgment of law wrongful and unlawfill.
In Bradstreetv. .reptune Ins. Co., 3 Sumn. 600, STORY, J., p.
604, says: "I know of no case where fraud, if established by
competent proofs, is not sufficient to overthrow any judgment oi
decree, however solemn may be its form and promulgation." The
case there was a decree of a foreign court in ren, which in geneWiFfe v. Alden,
ral was held to be conclusive. So in Harding
"fraud and
that
recognised
is
doctrine
9 Grecnl. 151, the general
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collusion, when pleaded and verified, vacate all judgments and
decrees." So is Broom's Legal Maxims *254, and cases cited.
As to the mode of avoiding a judgment or decree obtained by
fraud, there is some diversity in the decisions, although it is generally held that such judgment or decree cannot be collaterally
attacked by either party to it, but can be avoided only by proceedings instituted directly for that purpose. In some cases, how
ever, a bill in equity to restrain the pnforcement of such judgment
or decree has been sustained, as in Hfuggins v. King, 3 Barb. S. 0.
616, where a party had a good defence to a suit at law, but was
prevented setting it up by the gross fraud of the plaintiff and
others.
A similar doctrine was held in this state in Hibbard v. Eastman,
47 N. H. 507, and cases cited; so is 2 Kent's Com. 655, and so
is Vanmeter v. Jones, 2 Green Oh. N. J. 520. These cases clearly
recognise the doctrine that the party, injured by a judgment obtained by fraud, may in some form avoid the effect of it. The
general doctrine is also recognised in Great Falls Iianf'g. Go. v.
Worster, 45 N. H. 110.
It has been said that neither a party to a judgment nor a privy
can impeach it for fraud: 8 Cow. & Hill's Phillipps's Ev., not
610; but this doctrine was considered in Tebbett8 v. Tilton, .7;
N. H. 28, and repudiated, and for reasons that are entirely satisfactory to us. If the position had been taken that such judgment could not be collaterally impeached by a party or privy, it
would be supported by the authorities; and from the reference in
the note to Davy v. Haddon, 3 Doug. 310, and the notes to that
case which hold that a party must apply to the tribunal which
rendered the judgment to vacate it, it is not certain that anything
more was meant by the learned editors.
This doctrine, in regard to impeaching judgments and decrees
for fraud, has been applied in numerous cases to decrees in divorce suits and suits for nullity of marriage, and the weight of
authority is greatly in favor of such application. Upon princi.
ple, there is no solid ground for any distinction between decrees
in divorce suits and other judgments; or if there be any, it is to
be found in the much greater danger of fraud and imposition in
divorce cases as compared with others; thus adding largely to the
necessity and importance of preserving the power to correct or
vacate decrees that have been obtained by fraud and imposition.
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Accordingly it is laid down in Bishop on Mar. and Div., § 699,
that if a tribunal has been imposed upon, and in consequence of
the fraud a judgment of divorce has been wrongfully rendered, it
may vacate this judgment, when, upon a summary proceeding, it
is made cognisant of the fraud: and see Id., § 706, note 4, and
cases cited and also Id. 697. This is the doctrine of Allen v.
Maclellan, 12 Penna. St. 828 (2 Jones), and of -Dunnv. Dunn,
4 Paige Ch. 425.
In Story on Conflict of Laws, § 597, it is said, speaking of
foreign sentences of divorce, that "fraud in this, as in other cases,
will vitiate any judgment, however well founded in point of jurisdiction." So is 2 Kent's Com. *109. So in .oach v. Garvan, 1
Ves. Sen. 157, and Brownsword v. Edwards, 2 Ves. Sen. 243246, itis held that a sentence in divorce cases may be impeached for
fraud. So in Harrisonv. South Hampton, 22 L. J. Rep, N. S. Chan.
872, it was distinctly held that a sentence of an ecclesiastical court
pronouncing a marriage to be a nullity because one of the partie,
was within the age of consent, and consent not given, would bt
itself a nullity when obtained by collusion.
So the doctrine that a decree of divorce may be impeached for
fraud is recognised in Borden v. Fitch, 15 Johns. 121; Harding
v. Alden, 9 Greenl. 151, and Kerr v. Kerr, 41 N. Y. 272.
The counsel for the libellee have cited the cases of Greene
v. G-reene, 2 Gray 361, and Parish v. Parish,9 Ohio St. 534.
But the case of G-reene v. Greene merely decides that on an
original bill filed at a subsequent term a decree of divorce will
not be set aside for fraud and false testimony, and distinctly declines to give an opinion on the point whether such decree i.open
to any revisal by review, writ of error, certiorari,or any other
proceeding in the nature of an appeal, the court taking the ground
that such decree, when the court has jurisdiction, is conclusive
between the parties, unless revised on some legal proceeding instituted directly for that purpose, although third persons might be
allowed to attack it collaterally. And besides, it would seem that
Greene v. Greene has been overruled in Massachusetts in Edson
v. Edson, referred to in Bennett & Holland's Mass. Dig., vol. 3,
p. 233.
The case of Homer v. Fish, 1 Pick. 435, was cited and relied
upon. In that case, a suit was brought to recover back a sum
if money paid by the plaintiff to satisfy a judgment recovered on
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a policy of insurance, upon the ground that the judgment was
obtained by fraud; but the court held that the judgment, so long
as it was unreversed, was a bar to the recovery; and the court
cites with approval the decision of the court in Peck v. Woodbridge, 3 Day 36, that a man cannot collaterally impeach or call
in question a judgment of a court of law or decree in equity to
which he is a party. It can only be done directly, by writ of
error, petition for new trial, or bill in chancery.
These cases lend no aid to the position that a party to a decree
of divorce cannot, in any form, impeach it for fraud.
The Ohio case of Parishv. Parishwas an original bill in equity
to set aside a decree of divorce, on the ground that it was obtained
by fraud and perjury, and alleging also that the libellant had
suppressed the paper which contained notice of the suit.
A demurrer to the bill was sustained, and the reasoning goes to
the extent of holding that the decree was absolutely conclusive,
and not subject to be impeached, even for fraud. Some stress
was placed upon their statute, which provided that such decree
should be final and conclusive,-the court holding it, however, to
be in accordance with general policy. The result in this case is
like that in Greene v. Greene, 2 Gray 361, but, unlike that case,
it does not apparently leave open the question whether in some
form, by review or other proceeding brought directly to reverse
the decree, it ought not to be done.
To the reasoning in this case we cannot subscribe; and we
think it is opposed both to principle and authority. It is essential, indeed, to the due administration of justice, that courts should
have the power to protect themselves and their suitors against
fraud and imposition.
Of course this power will always be exercised with great caution, and especially after a long lapse of time, and after changes
in the status of persons upon the faith of decrees in cases like
this.
In the case before us, the libellee offers to prove that she bad
no notice of the pendency of the suit, and that the libellant,
knowing her residence, caused the notice to be published in a
newspaper that he bad every reason to believe neither she nor her
friends would see, for the purpose of concealing from her any
notice of the proceedings, and that the divorce was obtained by
fraud and perjury. Should it be made to appear that the libelVOL. XXI.-16
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lant, knowing where the libellee resided, fraudulently caused the
notice to be published in a paper not likely to be seen by her or
her friends with the purpose of preventing the notice reaching her,
and that the artifice was successful, the court ought not to hesitate to treat it as no notice at all, and no real compliance with the
requisitions of the statute. The order of notice may have been
complied with, but if fraudulently procured, with the very purpose of avoiding the giving of actual notice, it ought to be regarded
as what it really is, no notice at all.
Upon the other point, that the divorce was obtained by fraud
and perjury, it ought also to appear that the cause of divorce
alleged had in fact no existence; but, as no definitive judgment is
to be rendered, but only to determine how far testimony of this
character is admissible, it is unnecessary to examine further the
sufficiency of the offer. The great question is, whether, after this
lapse of time, this decree can be set aside or vacated for fraud or
imposition; and on that point we are clear that it may be if the
proofs are clear.
These views must not be understood to give any countenance
whatever to the idea that there may be a re-trial, merely, of a
divorce suit on the allegation of fraud. On the contrary, the
proof of fraud of a grave character ought to be clear; and the
court would be slow to reverse a decree of divorce, when tle
libellee appeared, or had due and actual notice to appear, unless
fraud of a serious character is established.
No objection is made in respect to the form of the application
nere, and we therefore assume that it is in writing, as it ought to
be, setting forth fully the grounds of the application.
Case discharged.

Supreme Court of Iowa.
IlE PEORIA AND ROOK ISLAND RAILWAY CO. v. ANDREW J.
PRESTON, APPELLANT.
Where the charter of a corporation fixes the amount of its capital stock and the
number of shares into which it shall be di'ideld, the corporation cannot make
assessments on the shares subscribed, for the purpose of carrying on the gencral
,rsiness of the company, until all the capital stock has been subscribed, unless
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either expressly or by implication a different intent appears in the charter, or in
the contract of subscription.
The charter of a railway company provided that its capital stock should be one
million dollars, and be divided into shares of one hundred dollars each; that the
persons named as corporators should be authorized to cause books to be opened for
receiving subscriptions to the stock to the amount of $100,000 ; that each subscriber at the time of subscription should pay five dollars on each share by him subscribed ; that the corporate powers should be vested in a board of nine directors ;
that the first election for directors should be held as soon as might be after said
$100,000 of stock should have been subscribed; that the directors should have
power, and were required, to re-open the books to fill up the capital stock, and to
continue to receive subscriptions thereto until the whole amount should have been
taken ; and that all subscriptions should be paid at such times, and in such
amounts, and on such conditions as the directors might prescribe.
Held, that the directors could not call for payments on the subscriptions until
the entire one million dollars of stock had been subscribed.
An act amending the charter of the company, by which it was authorized to
construct and maintain a branch railroad from some suitable point on its main
line to a point named in said amendatory act, did not so change the purposes of the
incorporation as to release previous subscribers to the stock from payment of their
subscriptions.

from Scott District Court.
Action to recover of defendant a subscription of five shares to
the capital stock of plaintiff, amounting to $500. The answer,
1st, denied each allegation of petition; 2d, averred that by the
act under which said plaintiff was incorporated, passed by the
legislature of Illinois, March 7th 1867, the capital stock of said
company was fixed at one million dollars, and that the directors
were required to receive subscriptions therefor until the whole
amount of capital stock should be taken. That at the time the
calls for payments were made by the directors, as alleged in the
petition, the said amount of one million dollars had not been subscribed for. Wherefore the directors had no authority under said
charter to make calls for payments on subscriptions beyond five
per cent. required to be paid at the time of subscription, and calls
so made were null and void.
The answer averred, fifthly, that on March 10th 1869, after
defendant had subscribed for stock, as alleged in petition, the
legislature of Illinois passed an act, amending the act of incorporation of said company, thereby essentially changing the purpose
and enterprise for which said corporation was originally incorporated, and that said company was authorized to construct a different line of railway, one terminus being fixed by said act at the
APPEAL
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city of Muscatine, and the other left indefinite. That said alteration of said charter was never assented to by defendant, but that
defendant being a citizen of Davenport, was induced to subscribe
for stock wholly for the promotion of the trade and prosperity of
his said place of residence, by the construction of said railway
from Peoria to Rock Island, and that by constructing said road
to Muscatine his motive in subscribing would be defeated, &c.
The other portion of the answer, and the amendments thereto,
are not necessary to an understanding of the decision.
The plaintiff demurred "to the second section of the answer,
because the subscription of one million dollars is not a condition
precedent to calls for payment on stock, and because subscriptions
of the entire capital are not necessary before calls can be made,
unless so stated in the agreement, or in the act of incorporation.
To the fifth section of answer, because it shows that the subsequent
act passed has only extended the powers of the corporation, and
not materially altered its object and interest."
The demurrer was sustained, and defendant excepted. Jury
trial on the remaining issues. Verdict and judgment for plaintiff. Defendant appeals
John

. Rogers and James T. Lane, for appellant.

Grant & Smith, for appellee.
We regard it as settled by the weight of authority
and reason, that where an act of incorporation fixes the amount,
of capital stock, and the number of shares into which it shall be
divided, the corporation cannot make an assessmout upon the
shares of a stockholder, for the purpose of carrying oi the general
business of the company, until all the capital stock has been subscribed, unless, either expressly or by implication, a different
intent appears in the charter, or in the contract of subscription.
The reasons for this rule are to our minds unanswerable. If the
capital stock is fixed at $100,000, divided into 1000 shares, the
subscriber of one share agrees to bear the hundredth part of the
expense incident to the enterprise. If one half of the capital
stock shall be found sufficient to accomplish the purposes of the
association, then his agreement is upon his share of $100 to pay 50.
If, however, an assessment can be made upon his share and the
business of the association entered upon when but $50,000 of
DAY, J.-I.
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stock is subscribed, the stockholder is compelled to bear the fiftieth
part of the expense of the undertaking. Thus a contract is
enforced against him, which he never executed, and the same is
true if an assessment can be made when anything less than the
whole amount of stock is subscribed. Besides, it is apparent that
some amount of stock must be subscribed before assessments can
be made. But if no provision is made in the charter, nor in the
contract of subscription, there is nothing by which this amount
can be fixed, unless it be the amount of capital stock which the
corporation is allowed to hold. If an assessment can be made
upon any less amount than this, there is just as much warrant of
law for entering upon the business of the association, and making
assessments upon stock when one hundredth, as when ninety-nine
hundredths of the stock is subscribed. Again, a person called
upon to take stock in an enterprise, considers the things to be
lone and the amount pledged to their accomplishment. If the undertaking can be commenced, before the amount designated is secured, the means of finishing what is begun may never be obtained,
and the amount expended may be lost. This whole question underwent an exhaustive discussion in Salem Mill-dam Co. v. Roper,
6 Pick. 23, decided in 1827. We despair of being able to add
anything to the reasons there assigned. See also s. c. 9 Pick. 1
87. This case was followed, in Massachusetts, by Turnpike Co.
v. Valentine, 10 Pick. 142, in 1880; by Cabot and West Springfield Bridge Co. v. Chapin,6 Cush. 50, in 1850; by Worcester 46
Nashua Railway Co. v. Hinds, 8 Cush. 110, in 1851; by Stoneham Branch Railway Co. v. Gould, 2 Gray 277, in 1854; in New
Hampshire, in New Hampshire Central Railway Co. v. Johnson,
10 Foster 390, decided in 1855; in Maine, in Penobscot Railway
Co. v. Dammer, 40 Maine 172, and in Old Town Railway Co. v.
Veazie, 89 Maine 571, both decided in 1855. See also Littleton
Manufacturing Co. v. Parker,14 N. H. 548, and Comstock Valley
Railway Co. v. Barker, 82 N. H. 363.
These cases all hold the doctrine above announced, and settle
the law in the three states named. We have not been referred to
any well considered case, holding the contrary view.
In Hamilton and Deansville Plank-Road Co. v. Rice, 7 Barb.
157, cited by appellee, the capital stock was fixed in the charter
at $26,000, but the act of incorporation provided that when $500
per mile was in good faith subscribed and five per cent. paid
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thereon, the subscribers might elect directors, execute their
articles and file them in the office of the secretary, and that frog
that time they should be a legally organized incorporation.
The agreement which the defendant signed, obligated him t,
become a member of the company as soon as the amount of stoel
required by the act of incorporation should be subscribed, and tq
pay the amount of subscription when the company should be
organized. Under this agreement it was very rightly held that
when $500 per mile was subscribed and the company organized,
the subscriber should pay the amount of his stock. This was no
more than an enforcement of the agreement according to its
terms.
In Bensselaer v. Wetzel, 21 Barb. 56, the facts are somewhat
different, but the whole case is based upon that of Hamilton and
Deansville Plank-Road Co. v. Rice, supra, the whole opinion upon
this branch of the case being as follows: "Nor was a subscription
to the full amount of the stock named in the articles a condition
precedent to the recovery," citing 7 Barb. 166. It is apparent
that as an authority upon the general proposition this case is
entitled to but little, if any, weight.
In Waterford v. Dalbiae, 6 Wels., Hurist. & Gord. 443, the
opinion is so meagre ihat it cannot be ascertained that it conflicts with the views hereinbefore expressed, the whole case being
disposed of in an opinion of less than three lines.
In Lexington and West Cambridge Railway Co. v. Chiandler,
18 Met. 811, the act of incorporation provided that the capital
stock should not exceed 2000 shares; that the number of shares
should be determined from time to time by the directors, and that,
as soon as 250 shares should be subscribed, the company should
proceed to construct and open their road. After more than "250
shares had been subscribed, the directors voted to close their
books. This, it was.held, was in effect fixing the number of shares
at that already subscribed, and a subscriber to the stock was held
liable. This is fully in accord with the views before expressed,
first, because the articles of incorporation authorized the company
to proceed to construct and open the road when 250 shares
should be subscribed; second, under the authorized vote of the
directors fixing the number of shares at that subscribed, the whole
stock was taken. In Fay's -Exr. v. Lexington and Big Sandy
Railway, 2 Mete. (Ky.) 814, the capital stock of the company was
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fixed at $1,000,000, but the charter provided that whenever stock
to the amount of $100,000 was subscribed, the company should
organize and go into complete operation. In an action against
a stockholder on assessment, it was held that the petition
must aver the subscription of $100,000. This case also is in
harmony with the general views here expressed. In Kenncbe
and PortlandBaiway Co. v. Jarvis, 34 Maine 360, the amount
of stock which the corporation might hold was not fixed in the
charter, but by a vote of the corporation, and this is the ground
of the holding that a stockholder may be made liable before all
the stock is subscribed. In The Iowa and Minn. Railway Co. v.
Perkins, 28 Iowa 281, the general question of the right of a corporation to collect assessments before all the stock should be subscribed, was not decided, the defendant being held liable in view of
the terms of his subscription.
The only case to which our attention has been called apparently
in conflict with the leading case in 6 Pick. 23, is that of Schenectady Plank-road Co. v. Thatcher, 11 N. Y. 102. The opinion
advances no reasoning in opposition to the Massachusetts cases,
which it seems to 'misapprehend, and from the facts of which it
seeks to distinguish the case in hand.
We feel warranted, therefore, both from authority and reason,
in holding that where an act of incorporation fixes the amount of
capital stock which a corporation may hold, no assessment can be
made upon the share of a stockholder until all the stock is subscribed, unless a contrary intention appears, expressly or by implication, either in the charter or the contract of subscription.
II. The next question which presents itself is as to the proper
construction of the charter. Does it contain anything evincing
an intention that assessments may be made upon the shares before
the subscription of all the capital stock ? Section three of the
charter provides that the capital stock of the company shall be
$1,000,000, and be divided into shares of $100 each. Section
four of the act provides that the persons named as corporators
shall be authorized to cause books to be opened for receivimg subscriptions to said capital stock to the amount of $100,000;
that each subscriber, at The time of subscription, shall pay to said
commissioners the sum of five dollars on each share by him subscribed; and that when the directors of said corporation shall
have been elected the commissioners shall deliver to them the
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amount of money received, and the books and papers belonging
to the company. Section five vests the corporate powers of the
company in a board of nine directors, and provides that they shall
elect from among themselves a president and vice-president, and
shall have power to appoint a secretary treasurer, and all other
officers deemed necessary for the transaction of the business of
said company, and to require such officers to give security for the
faithful performance of the duties of their offices. Section six
provides that the first election for directors shall be holden as
soon as may be after the said $100,000 of stock shall have been
subscribed. Section seven of the charter is as follows: "The
directors shall have power, and are hereby required, to re-open
the books to fill up the capital stock of said company, and shall
continue to receive subscriptions thereof until the whole amount
of such capital (not subscribed before said commissioners) shall
have been taken, and shall also receive subscriptions to the additional capital stock of said company, should the same be increased
by said directors, pursuant to the authority herein given, at such
time and places as the directors may deem expedient; and all
subscription to the stock of said company shall be paid at such
times and in such amounts, and on such conditions as said directors
may prescribe, under the penalty of the forfeiture of the stock
and all previous payments thereon; and they shall give notice of
the payments thus required, and of the place where and the time
when the same are required to be paid,, at least thirty days previous to the time hlen said payments shall be required to be
made, by publication in such newspaper and at such time a, -ai.t
directors shall determine."
These are all the provisions of the charter affecting Mae question
under consideration. They contain nothing, it seems to us.
evincing an intention that assessments may be made before all
the capital stock is subscribed.
The commissioners were authorized to open the books and
receive subscriptions to the amount of $100,000, thus taking the
initiatory steps toward the organization of the corporation. The
charter requires five per cent. of the subscription to be paid at
the time of subscription. It would be manifestly inexpedient to
allow these commissioners, without any bond for the faithful perforimaice of their duties, to take the entire subscription of
*1,000,000, and receive five per cent. thereon, amounting to
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850,000. Prudence, and even necessity, required some organization of the company before all the capital stock was subscribed.
Hence the charter provides that when $100,000 shall have been
subscribed, directors shall be elected, who shall select from their
number a president and vice-president, appoint a secretary and
treasurer, and require them to give bond for the faithful discharge
of their duties. The charter requires these directors to re-open
the books, and to continue to receive subscriptions until the whole
amount of the capital stock not subscribed before the commissioners shall have been taken. This duty is specifically enjoined
upon them. A failure to perform it is a failure to observe the
positive requirements of the charter. This section contains
nothing authorizing an assessment until all the capital stock is
subscribed. True, it provides that the subscriptions shall be paid
at such times and in such amounts and on such conditions &s the
directors may prescribe. But this evidently means that when the
company has so far complied with the conditions of its charter as
to be entitled to subscriptions, then the directors may prescribe
the times and amounts and conditions of payment. It surely
does not mean that, notwithstanding the requirement that the
directors shall re-open the books and continue to receive subscriptions until the whole amount of stock is taken, they may nevertheless refuse to do so, enter upon the construction'of the road,
and assess the shareholders to the full value of their shares.
And yet it does mean this, or no authority is conferred to assess
until all the stock is subscribed. But two limits upon the authority
of the board of directors to do everything necessary to the accomplishment of the objects of the corporation can legally be deduced
from the charter. The one is when $100,000 of stock is subscribed.
The other is when all the stock is taken. There is no logical
ground upon which the authority can be claimed to arise at any
intermediate point. The former limit nullifies the provision of
the section requiringthe directors to re-open their books and fill
up the stock. Such a construction is not admissible. It follows,
therefore, that the latter is the true limit. There is nothing at
all unreasonable in this construction. One million dollars of stock
is certainly not a very extravagant sum for the building of ninety
miles of railroad, when it is borne in mind that almost, if not
quite, that sum would be necessary for the ironing of the road
alone. Nor does *his construction place any impediment in the
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way of corporations. It is quite easy for them to provide that
operations shall begin, and assessments shall be made, when any
given amount of stock shall have been subscribed. But when the
charter is silent upon the subject, the court cannot establish an
amount, and say that when that is reached the liability of shareholders shall attach. Such a course would be found to be as impracticable and unsatisfactory in its execution as oppressive and
unjust in its results. Courts enforce contracts, but do not make
them. The charter construed in Salem 1"iill-dam Co. v. Roper,
6 Pick. 23, was in all essential respects like the one involved in
this case.
Our conclusion is, that the charter does not confer authority to
make assessments upon the shares of the stockholders until all the
stock is subscribed, and that the demurrer to this portion of the
answer was improperly sustained.
IIl. The amendment to plaintiff's charter set up, in the fifth
section of the answer, authorizes plaintiff to construct and maintain a branch or lateral railway from some suitable point on its
main line, to a point on the Mississippi river, opposite the city of
Muscatine, in Iowa. It does not essentially change the original
purposes of the incorporation. The incorporation is not relieved
from the necessity of building a railroad from Peoria to Rock
Island, as originally contemplated. The amendment merely confers enlarged powers and additional privileges upon plaintiff.
That it is not of such a character as to exonerate a subscriber to
the stock from his obligation, the authorities cited in the briefs
of counsel abundantly show: see Barrettv. Alton and Sangamon
Railroad Co., 13 Ill. 504; Peoria and Oquawka Railroad Co. v.
Elting, 17 Id. 420; Sprague v. lllinois Railroad Co., 19 Id. 174;
_llinois Railroad Co. v. Zinmer, 20 Id. 654. The demurrer to
this portion of the answer was properly sustained.
If under this charter the corporation should undertake the construction of a lateral branch largely increasing the cost of the
enterprise, and bearing an undue proportion to the original undertaking, they might be enjoined from so doing at the suit of a
stockholder. And if such design should be accomplished, a stockholder might be released from liability. But the mere conferring
of authority to build a lateral branch, without more, which is all
that appears in this case, should not, in our opinion, have tlt
effect.
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Other alleged errors in the admission of evidence, and the giving of instructions, were assigned and argued, but it is believed
that the views herein expressed render a separate consideration
of them unnecessary. For the error before alluded to the judgment is reversed, and the cause remanded.
Reversed.
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Statutes are generally to be construed so as not to include the state or affect its
rights unless it is specially named, or it is clear that it was intended to be included.
Although the general rule in the construction of statutes, in cases where the
state is a party to the suit, is as above stated, yet under the Homestead Act of
Missouri exempting certain property from execution, a homestead acquired before
the right or action accrued to the state, and not exceeding the statutory exemption,
is exempt from execution issued in favor of the state, it being included by implication in the act, and the intention so to include the state, being apparent from

analogous legislation.
ERROR to Circuit Court of Ballinger county.
in the opinion of the court.

The facts are set forth

B. Benson Cahoon, for plaintiff in error.
I. The statutes of Missouri nowhere direct, that in criminal proceedings of bail, no person shall be accepted as bail who is not possessed of
property greater than the amount exempt by law from asxecution : 'Wagner's Statutes of Mo. 1078, § 30.
II. The enforcement of the Homestead Law against the state, in cases
like the one at bar, would interfere with and retard the administration
of criminal justice. Its enforcement in such cases is inessential to the
sovereign capacity of the state: Broom Leg. Max. 5th Am. d. 372;
and a sound public policy requires that the state be held not subject to
the operation of exemption laws, unless expressly named in such statutes.
III. A proceeding by scire facias, upon a forfeited recognisance, is
not a civil action, within the meaning of the Practice Act; but a mere
continuation of an existing proceeding, which was criminalin its nature:
State v. Randolph, 22 Mo. 474.
The statute of Missouri providing for the relief of insolvents, confined
on criminal process (W. S. 1125), in default of the payment of any costs
or fines, on account of any criminal proceeding, expressly egatives the
exemption of property in such cases, by providing that the person so
committed shall render all his property (except the wearing apparel of
himself and family), and that all the estate then or afterwards owned
by such person, shall be liable to execution for the payment of such
costs and expenses: W. S. 1125, §§ 1, 5, 10, 13. By analogy the appli-
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cation is pertinent in this case: Tam on Legal Judg., Am. Ed. 1871,
pp. 116, 117; and moreover, nothing is exempt for taxes due the state:
W. S. o-5, § 15.
IV. The general language used in the Homestead Act (W. S. 697,
§ 1) should not embrace, and ought not to apply, to executions issued in
favr of the state. It is a principle of universal application, in the
con-truction of statutes, that the state will not be considered included,
unls by exprcss procision or necessamy umZJlication : Sedg. on Con. and
Stat. Law 395, and authorities there cited ; Broom Leg. Max., 5th Am.
Ed. § 72. The maxim, "Roy n'est lie per ascun statute si il ve soit
exywessment nosmc," applies in the case at bar : Broom Leg. Max. § 70;
and it was held to apply in the construction 0 f the English Statute of
Insolvency: Broom Leg. Max. § 72; Chit. Pre. Crown 366, 388; Rex
v. Copl,,nd, Hughes 204, 230; Vin. Abr. ,Stat. E. 10.
V. The Homestead Act exempting property from the satisfaction of
debts, is a statute against common right, amid should be strictly construed : Sedg. on Con. and Stat. Law 344 to 347 ; Rite v. Alter, 5 Denio
119 ; Allea v. Cook, 26 uBarb.
347;
Obsea. v. Nelson, 3 Minn. 53.
n
e
V [. The maxim, " arg m tua ab iconvecietil)lurimut valet in lege,"p
applies with foirce in the construction of the ioniestead Act in this case:
JBroom. Leg. Max. §§ 174, 175, and authorities there cited; for, to hold,
that the state is included in the provisions of the act, would work a hardship upon criminals, and at the same time neutralize bail as a means of
security to them from discomfort: Ram on Leg. Judg., Am. Ed. 1871,
pp. 11 to 115.
VII. The statute of Missouri provides (W. S. 790, § 2) that judgments of courts of record are liens on all real estate of delendants. in
counties in which they are rendered : Hoyt v. flzyne, 3 Wis. 752 ; Allen
v. Cook, 26 Barb. 347 ; Folsom v. Carlie, 5 Minn. 333. There being a
lien by the judgment of the Circuit Court, then the sale should not have
been set aside, even though the state be included in the Iomestead Act,
for the sale. in such a case. should have been left intact, to protect the
rights of the purchaser after the death of the parties entitled to the
bomnestead-their arrival at age or abandonment of the premises as a
homestead : Kelly's Mo. Probate Guide 361 ; W. S. 98, § 5. Such being
the ease, there was an interest in the property aside from the homestead,
subject to execution.
-1. C. Kctchurn, for defendant in error.
The opinion of the court was delivered by
WAGNEt, J.-Tlme facts of this case are agreed upon, and the only
quo.-tion is, whether the owner of a honiestead can claim exemption
a.,imdst an exeeuti3n issued in favor of the state.
'['he defendant. Abernathy, was surety on a forfeited recognisance. on
which the state obtained a final judgment, and caused execution t) be
ismel. lie was the head of a family and owned 120 acres of lind. on
wh;,.h lie re,.iede, valued at less than 81500. which was acquired previous to the time the oblization occurred. When the sheriff levied on
the preimis,s he claimed that they were exemt under the provisimns of
the Homestead Act; but they were sold, notwithstanding, and he then
moved the court to set the sale aside, which motion was sustained. Bad

